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2Mandates, Legal Foundations, Powers
and Conduct of Commissions of Inquiry
A. Wayne MacKay*
1. COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY: THEIR NATURE AND
IDENTITY
Like so much of "real" administrative law [the role of public inquiries] lies in
the borderland between "law", "political science" and "practical politics", with
the result that few have ventured to explore it, it being too high for the lawyers,
too low for the political scientists and too arduous for the practical politicians.'
As the above quote from John Willis suggests, few have attempted to
elucidate the role of public inquiries in Canadian life. With typical legal arro-
gance I shall ignore the warning that my topic is too "high" for lawyers; take
comfort in the fact that it is too "low" for political scientists; and with respect
to the challenge that the task would pose for practical politicians, I shall rely
on the following pithy observation of a British judge.
* Professor of Law, Dalhousie University. The author gratefully acknowledges the research
assistance of Gordon Krinke, a 1988 Dalhousie Law School graduate, now practicing law
in Calgary, Alberta.
I J. Willis, "Comment, The Role of the Public Inquiry in Our Constitutional System" in J.S.
Ziegel, ed., Law and Social Change (Agincourt: The Carswell Company Ltd., 1973) at 98.
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My attitude towards political life is much the same as that of a monk towards
sex, nostalgic memories of youthful indiscretion, a frank acknowledgment of its
attractions and unshakable conviction that I could do better than those currently
engaged in it... 2
Indeed, it may be just as difficult to disentangle law and politics as it is to
separate religious and sexual passions. While law has traditionally been
presented as more value-neutral than politics, in either its academic or applied
form, the inaccuracy of this view of law is becoming widely recognized.
Value choices have always been a vital aspect of legal adjudication and the
arrival of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 has forced
judges to be more overt about this aspect of their job.' The separation of law
and politics is more a matter of mythology than fact and nowhere is that more
apparent than in the operation of public inquiries. The question that I have
been asked to address is what kind of child has been born of this classically
Canadian union of law and politics.
Answering the question is far from simple. The varieties of inquiries are
as diverse as the legal and political couplings from which they emerge. They
range from full-scale royal commissions to the state of Canadian political and
economic life to very specific investigations into particular situations. There
is a vast difference between the Macdonald Royal Commisson on the
Canadian Economy, which laid the foundation for free trade with the United
States, and a coroner's inquest into the death of a particular individual.
Because of the diverse use of the public inquiry device, this classic Canadian
institution is suffering from an identity crisis.
The juxtaposition of commissions of inquiry and identity crises provides
a quintessential Canadian topic. Sandwiched between our British and French
roots and pervasive influences from our American neighbour to the south,
Canadians appear to be in a perpetual state of identity crisis. One feature of
Canadian political life which might serve to establish a unique identity is the
extensive use of public inquiries. If hockey could somehow be worked into
this topic the fit would be perfect. Perhaps we can take some consolation from
the fact that as I write this article Mr. Justice Dubin is conducting a public
inquiry into the use of steroids in Canadian sport. Commissions of inquiry do
2 Sir J. Donaldston, speech given to a High Court Journalists' Dinner, as quoted in
"Industrial Relations Court not Political, President Says" The Times (1972 November 24)
3.
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982 c. II. See W. MacKay, "Interpretation of the Charter of Rights: Law, Politics and
Poetry" in G. Beaudoin, ed., Charter Cases 1986-87 (Cowansville: Yvon Blais Inc.,
1987) at 347.
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appear to be part of the Canadian identity, which lends a further air of urgency
to solving the identity crisis of the former.
One of the reasons that the nature of public inquiries is confusing is that
governments often fail to distinguish between the different kinds of inquiries.
It is rare that the orders in council establishing an inquiry actually give it a
name. The MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry or the Berger Commission was
not given either of these names in its mandate but it was left to the media to
give the inquiry an appropriate shorthand title. In legal terms, there is no real
distinction between a public inquiry and a royal commission. In practical
terms, the latter title is generally reserved for matters of national significance,
for example, The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.
There are no clear rules, however. Given its significance for Canada, the Ber-
ger Commission might have been designated the Royal Commission on
Northern Gas Pipeline Construction. Similarly, *the Commission on the Non-
Medical Use of Drugs has often been referred to as the LeDain Inquiry.
The naming of an inquiry can be important. The failure of the govern-
ment to provide a workable title will leave the matter squarely in the hands of
the media. Whatever long title the government might have wished to use, the
investigation into the prosecution of Donald Marshall was destined to be the
Marshall Inquiry. There has been a clear tendency to personalize commissions
of inquiry either in terms of the presiding commissioner or one of the key
participants. When the commissioners have names such as LeDain, Berger or
Dubin, there is little chance of confusion but when the name is MacDonald, it
is not quite so clear. The McDonald Commission on the R.C.M.P. and the
Macdonald Royal Commission into the Canadian Economy, while distingu-
ishable, can be easily confused. The Marshall Inquiry and the Sinclair Stevens
Inquiry focus on the participants while others such as the Ocean Ranger
Inquiry and the Hinton Train Inquiry emphasize the incidents that gave birth to
the inquiry in the first place. A focus on the commissioner can also be confus-
ing where he or she has conducted numerous public inquiries as is the case
with Charles Dubin and Alexander Hickman. There seem to be no clear rules
on naming the commission but it is clear that the name sets the tone for the
media coverage of its deliberations.
A central theme of this article is the.vital role that the media plays in the
operation of an inquiry and its public identity. Whatever the government
states in the order in council creating a commission it is unlikely to be report-
ed verbatim in the media. It is the media which must act as an intermediary
between the work of a particular commission and the broader public that it is
designed to serve. In a time when inquiries are created for a vast array of so-
cial problems, the difficulty which the media may have in delineating the role
of a particular commission is understandable. Given the significance of the
media's role in making commissions effective, I can only urge that they
explore the many species that come under the genus "public inquiry."
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In a trail-blazing work on Canadina public inquiries Liora Salter and
Debra Slaco set out two major categories.'
Inquiry as a Research Study
An inquiry that views itself as a
research study must have some
means, either within or separate
from it, of generating independent
data.
An inquiry that uses the research
model can take the complexity of
information, the inter-relationship
of variables and the conflicting
views of scientists into account.
An inquiry that uses the research
model is sensitive to that which is
not known and it becomes as open-
ended as science itself.
Inquiry as Arbitration
An inquiry that uses the arbitration
model is highly dependent upon the
quality of research brought into the
process.
An inquiry that uses the arbitration
model forces scientists to speak a
language that lay people can under-
stand. It reduces complexities to
problems which are manageable and
translates science and technology
into something which is seen to
have important public effects.
An inquiry that uses the arbitration
model forces closure on issues.
While the focus of the authors was on scientific inquiries, their models
have a broader application as well. The Macdonald Royal Commission on the
Canadian Economy was primarily within the "Research Study" model and
aimed at an open-ended inquiry into the Canadian economy and political
state. It remained for the Canadian public in the 1988 federal election to
"arbitrate" in a closed fashion on the recommendation of free trade with the
United States, which emerged from the Macdonald Commission. Some
inquiries could adopt both models at different stages in their operation. The
early stages of the Nova Scotian Marshall Inquiry were concerned with the
wrongful prosecution of Donald Marshall and conducted more like an arbitra-
tion. In the latter stages of the Inquiry, when the commissioners directly
explored the problem of racism in the Nova Scotia justice system, they opera-
ted more under the research study model. The same dual approach may be
4 L. Salter and D. Slaco, Public Inquiries in Canada (Hull: Canadian Government Publish-
ing Centre, 1981) at 160.
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adopted by Mr. Justice Dubin to separate the specific facts surrounding the
Ben Johnson case and the wider social problem of steroid use by Canadian
athletes.
In an earlier work, former Supreme Court Justice Gerald LeDain divides
public inquiries into three major categories.5
1. Determination of Public Policy
2. Review of Political Judgment
3. Determination of Guilt or Innocence
As with the previous typology, these categories are not mutually exclusive
and wide-ranging inquiries such as Nova Scotia's Marshall Inquiry may
involve the performance of all three functions.
In the preceding piece in this volume, Frank Iacobucci, now chief Judge
of the Federal Court, explores the origins of inquiries and the pros and cons of
using a commission of inquiry compared to other governmental devices.6
Concerns about cost, judicial overkill and delay are particularly acute with the
wide-ranging inquiries designed to determine public policy. The role of
lawyers is also less obvious in policy inquiries such as the Macdonald Royal
Commission on the Canadian Economy. There was some recognition of this
fact in the absence of a commission counsel for the Macdonald Commission,
although the Hon. Donald Macdonald is a lawyer by profession, as well as
politician.
A review of political judgment is often the most controversial kind of
inquiry for a judge to become embroiled in. The genesis of such a commission
is often the desire of the relevant political actors to avoid a hot political issue,
by putting it in the judicial deep freeze. One of the dangers of these inquiries
is that the judge who agrees to preside over a review of political judgment puts
his/her reputation for objectivity on the line and rarely escapes totally
unscathed. A classic illustration of this problem was the involvement of Mr.
Justice Spence in the Gerda Munsinger Inquiry in the mid-1960s. He was for-
ced to walk the narrow line between law and politics with only partial success.
The dangers implicit in this exercise have not scared away all judges. Chief
Justice Parker's Sinclair Stevens Inquiry and former Supreme Court Justice
Estey's Banking Inquiry are two recent examples of judges reviewing acts of
political judgment.
An inquiry into the guilt or innocence of particular parties most clearly
draws upon the skills of lawyers. The concerns about fair process and accurate
5 G. LeDain, "The Role of the Public Inquiry in Our Constitutional System" in J.S. Ziegel,
ed., supra, note 1.
6 Chapter 1, Commissions of Inquiry and Public Policy in Canada at 1.
34 COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY
facts, which lawyers bring to such an investigation, are vital. There are, how-
ever, concerns about prejudicing the rights of individuals in later judicial
proceedings by compelling them to take part in a highly public inquiry
process. In addition to the potential problems of self-incrimination, there are
real difficulties in maintaining a presumption of innocence in later court
proceedings. These kinds of problems were highlighted in Mr. Justice
Grange's Susan Nelles Inquiry into the infant deaths at the Toronto Hospital
for Sick Children. I shall explore the threat to individual rights posed by
commissions of inquiry later in this paper.
2. BROAD MANDATES AND CONSITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
The mandates of commissions of inquiry are as varied as the orders in
council or other legal mechanisms used to establish them. Some of the tasks to
be carried out would normally include: ascertaining the facts, identifying the
relevant issues, researching problems, educating the public on certain issues
and making recommendations on matters of public policy. While created by
government, one of the major attractions of an inquiry as an instrument of
public policy is its independence from the governments of the day. They are
special creations of the executive branch but are not answerable to it, as is a
regular government department. Terms of reference for commissions of
inquiry are usually broadly stated and governments have little control over the
shape or direction of the inquiry.
In their procedures and operations, commissions of inquiry sometimes
resemble courts but they are not a branch of the judiciary. Mr. Justice David
McDonald, in a ruling during the R.C.M.P. Commission, put the issue suc-
cinctly. "The Executive Branch through its chosen Executive instrument, is
examining itself.' Liora Salter in her contribution to this volume refers to the
advantages of "putting the state on trial"8 and at the same time allowing
democratic input into the making of government policy.
Both federal and provincial governments have enacted inquiries statutes
conferring broad powers on the executive to set up such bodies. There are also
a number of other federal9 and provincial statutes containing powers to estab-
lish commissions, either under the relevant inquiries statute or otherwise.
Once an inquiry has been created there is a dearth of guidance on how it
should proceed. Anthony and Lucas have written A Handbook on the Conduct
7 Re RCMP Commission (1978), 94 D.L.R. (3d) 365 at 370.
8 Chapter 11, The Two Contradictions in Public Inquiries at 173.
9 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Commissions of Inquiry - Working Paper 17
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1977) at 77-86 contains a list of the relevant
federal statutes.
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of Public Inquiries in Canada0 which is a well documented analysis of the
proper role of inquiries within the Canadian legal system. For most front-line
commissioners, the operations "Bible" is Harry Wilson's Commissions of
Inquiry: A Handbook on Operations."
The breadth of the legislative mandate available to commissions of
inquiry is best illustrated by quoting from a couple of representative statutes.
Section 2 of the federal Inquiries Act'2 states:
The Governor in Council may, whenever the Governor in Council deems it
expedient, cause inquiry to be made into and concerning any matter connected
with the good government of Canada or the conduct of any part of the public
business thereof.
An equivalent section in Nova Scotia's Public Inquiries Act 3 reads:
The Governor in Council may whenever he deems it expedient cause inquiry to
be made into and concerning any public matter in relation to which the Legisla-
ture of Nova Scotia may make laws.
As the latter portion of the Nova Scotia statute emphasizes and the fed-
eral statute alludes to in more general terms, a commission of inquiry must
operate within the constitutional authority of the level of government which
created it. "4 These constitutional limits on the madate of inquiries distinguish
them from other forms of public policy research.
In Di Irio v. Montreal Jail Warden, 5 it is established that there are
constitutional limits on the operation of a provincial inquiry. There are
suggestions that a provincial inquiry can touch on federal issues and possibly
even recommend changes in federal laws but could not directly inquire into a
federal matter. In A.G. (Quebec) v. A.G. (Canada),6 the Supreme Court held
that the federal Solicitor General could not be subpoenaed to appear before the
Quebec crime commission. The principles enunciated in the previous two
10 R. Anthony and A. Lucas, A Handbook on the Conduct of Public Inquiries in Canada
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1985). I am indebted to their research and organization in this part
of my paper.
11 H.A. Wilson, Commission of Inquiry: A Handbook on Operations (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1983).
12 Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-11, s.2.
13 Public Inquiries Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 250, s. 1.
14 A.G. (Quebec) v. A.G. (Canada), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 218, 6 C.R. (3d) 145, 43 C.C.C. (2d)
49, 90 D.L.R. (3d) 161, 24 N.R. 1.
15 [1978] 1 S.C.R. 152, 35 C.R.N.S. 57, 8 N.R. 361.
16 Supra, note 14.
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cases on the federal limits of commissions of inquiry were reaffirmed in the
recent Supreme Court decision in O'Hara v. B.C. 7
The Marshall Inquiry in Nova Scotia has spawned some fundamental
constitutional questions of a different type. In a precedent-setting ruling, the
Nova Scotia Supreme Court, at both the trial and appeal divisions, held that
Ministers of the Crown could be compelled to testify about cabinet conversa-
tions germane to the compensation of Donald Marshall Jr.8 The convention of
cabinet confidentiality had to give way, in controlled circumstances, to the
proper administration of justice in the form of a full public inquiry. Commis-
sion counsel did not have the same success in compelling the judges of the
Nova Scotia Supreme Court Appeal Division to appear before the Marshall
Inquiry.'" In the Marshall situation, concerns about the objectivity and
independence of the judiciary won over the potential value of the judges' testi-
mony in the proper administration of justice. Having opened the cabinet room
to the Marshall Inquiry, Nova Scotian judges were not so willing to open the
door to their own chambers of deliberation.
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms introduced as part of the Constitu-
tion Act, 19 8 2 ' also places constitutional limits on the operations of commis-
sions of inquiry. In large measure, the Charter will reinforce the statutory and
common law protections for individual rights that are already present in the
inquiry process. Anthony and Lucas argue in their book that the Charter may
even place limits on the creation of a commission of inquiry.2' They cite as an
example the possible violation of freedom of religion in setting up an inquiry
into a particular religious group. Except in most unusual circumstances, I
doubt that the substantive provisions of the Charter would bar the creation of
a particular inquiry. However, the legal rights contained in sections 7 to 14 of
the Charter will have an impact on how commissions operate once they have
been established. The net result of this impact will be the enhancement of the
rights of the individual caught up in the inquiry process.
17 O'Hara v. B.C., [1987] 2 S.C.R. 591, 19 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273, [19881 1 W.W.R. 216, 38
C.C.C. (3d) 233, 45 D.L.R. (4th) 527, 80 N.R. 127.
18 A.G. (Nova Scotia) v. Royal Comm. into the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution (1988), 222
A.RR. 183, 87 N.S.R. (2d) 183, 44 C.C.C. (3d) 330, 54 D.L.R. (4th) 153 (C.A.).
19 A.G. (Nova Scotia) v. Royal Comm. into the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution (1988), 222
A.P.R. 443, 87 N.S.R. (2d) 443, 46 C.C.C. (3d) 191 (C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C.
granted (1989), 89 N.S.R. (2d) 90 (note) (S.C.C.).
20 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 1I.
21 Supra, note 10 at 9.
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3. THREATS TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE INQUIRY
PROCESS
Nowhere are the distinctions between lawyers' values and policy makers'
values likely to be more pronounced than in the protection of individual rights
in the inquiry process. The public policy role of an inquiry requires a high
degree of flexibility and discretion which will be stifled if too many proce-
dural and legalistic protections are placed upon its operation. From the
lawyer's perspective the failure to provide individuals with proper legal
safeguards would render the inquiry process fundamentally unfair. The
challenge is to strike the proper balance between creative articulation of
public policy and the proper protection of the rights of the individuals
involved in the process. The difficulty in striking this balance was dramatical-
ly exemplified in the Susan Nelles Inquiry presided over by Mr. Justice
Grange and discussed in his contribution to this volume.'
There are a number of dangers to the rights of individuals implicit in the
inquiry process. By design, commissions of inquiry provide fewer procedural
protections than are available in the courts. This can lead to problems such as
self-incrimination which can disadvangage an individual in later criminal
proceedings. While the consequences are less severe, a commission's deter-
mination of culpability can significantly affect later civil proceedings as well.
Unlike preliminary inquiries, commissions of inquiry are highly public and
individuals can suffer a loss of reputation regardless of the ultimate findings.
The fact that many different proceedings can converge on a single situation
creates the impression of double or triple jeopardy without the protection that
would accompany such a legal conclusion. As an example, a single case of
police misconduct could produce an internal investigation, an inquiry, a
human rights complaint, civil proceedings and a criminal prosecution.
Some statutory protections are built into inquiries Acts in recognition of
the need to protect individuals in the inquiry process. Under the federal
statute, affected individuals have the right to be represented by legal counsels
and any person against whom there is a charge or allegation of misconduct has
a right to notice of such charge or allegation. 24 Similar kinds of statutory
protections also exist at the provincial level.2 However, the degree of protec-
tion varies from one province to another. For example, Nova Scotia's Act
provides, in rather open-ended fashion, for "full investigation of the matter"
and pays little attention to the protection of individual rights.26
22 Chapter 9, How Should Lawyers and the Legal Profession Adapt? at 151. See also: Nelles
v. Grange (1984), 42 C.P.C. 109, 9 D.L.R. (4th) 79, 3 O.A.C. 40 (C.A.).
23 Inquiries Act, supra, note 12, s. 12.
24 Inquiries Act, supra, note 12, s.13
25 Public Inquiries Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.41 1, s.5.
26 Public Inquiries Act, supra, note 13, s.3.
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The problems of protecting individuals involved in a commission of
inquiry are accentuated by the barriers to judicial review of commission deter-
minations. There is no direct form of repeal, appeal or review of the findings
of an inquiry.' In Ontario, there is a "stated case" mechanism available"
while Quebec, at the other end of the judicial access spectrum, appears to
severely limit judicial review of inquiries.29 At the federal level, the avail-
ability of judicial review depends upon untangling the mess of sections 18 and
28 of the Federal Court Act and drawing the line between administrative and
judicial decisions.3"
One of the potential problems with traditional judicial review of inquiries
is that their role is to advise and make recommendations rather than to make
the final decisions on matters. Traditionally judicial review has only been
available at the final decision stage and not an intermediary advisory stage.3
This position has been softened by the evolution of the doctrine of fairness
even for administrative decision making. In Re Abel and Advisory Review
Board,32 Mr. Justice Grange applied the procedural rules of fairness to the
decision of an advisory body. There is some judicial support for taking this
same approach with respect to the decisions of a commission. 33
Statutory provisions under the federal Inquiries Act add to procedural
protections at common law by imposing a right to counsel under section 12.
Like most guarantees of a right to counsel, there are no provisions for funding
this legal representation and this is a real economic barrier to the involvement
of groups and individuals in complex inquiries. As inquiry processes become
more judicial in their character, the economic hurdles to citizen participation
increase, unless the government is willing to pay the legal expenses of the
participants.' In the famous Landreville v. R.,11 findings of Mr. Justice Rand
were struck down 11 years after the fact on the basis of improper notice
pursuant to section 13 of the federal Inquiries Act.
27 Supra, note 10, chapter VIII. This chapter provides a thorough analysis of the availability
of judicial review.
28 Public Inquiries Act, supra, note 25, s.6.
29 Public Inquiry Commissions Act, R.S.Q., c.C-37, s.17.
30 R.S.C. 1985, c.F-7, s.18, s.28.
31 Guay v. LaFleur, [1965] S.C.R. 12, 119641 C.T.C. 350, 64 D.T.C. 5218, 47 D.L.R. (2d)
226.
32 (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 279, 46 C.C.C. (2d) 342, 97 D.L.R. (3d) 304 (Div. Ct.), affirmed
(1980), 31 O.R. (2d) 520 56 C.C.C. (2d) 153, 119 D.L.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.).
33 One judge in Fraternitg Inter-Provinciale des Ouvriers en Electricite v. Office de la
Construction du Quebec (1983), 148 D.L.R. (3d) 626 (Que. C.A.), applied the doctrine of
fairness to commissions.
34 Various groups appearing before Nova Scotia's Marshall Inquiry were funded by the
government of Nova Scotia. Similarly Sinclair Stevens' legal fees were covered at the
federal level. These are exceptions.
35 [1977] 2 F.C. 726, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 380 (T.D.).
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The newest avenue of judicial review on both the substantive and proce-
dural aspects of the work of commissions of inquiry is the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.36 In all likelihood it is the legal rights contained in
sections 7 to 14 of the Charter which will have the major impact on administr-
ative action generally and commissions of inquiry in particular. It is possible
that substantive guarantees such as the fundamental freedoms in section 2 and
the equality guarantees in section 15 could be used to challenge the way in
which a particular inquiry operates. For example, it might have been argued
that nurses were singled out in the Susan Nelles Inquiry and given less
favourable treatment than doctors. Such an argument is unlikely to meet the
judicial threshold for equality rights,37 but the potential for such arguments is
present.
A major concern for people appearing before commissions of inquiry is
self-incrimination. In some cases the evidence may be used in later
proceedings, or if the Charter or statutory protections prevent that, it may be
used as a way of obtaining derivative evidence of an offence. In recognition of
this problem the self-incrimination protections of both federal and provincial
evidence Acts have been applied to commissions of inquiry.38 The extent to
which the Charter may be used to supplement this statutory protections is not
yet clear.
The relevant Charter provisions are sections 11 (c) and 13 which read as
follows:
11. Any person not charged with an offence has the right
(c) not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that per-
son in respect of the offence;
13. A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any
incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any
other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving of
contradictory evidence.
36 Supra, note 20, s. 52.
37 Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273, [1989] 2
W.W.R. 289, 10 C.H.R.R. D/5719, 36 C.R.R. 193, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1,91 N.R. 255. The
articulation of a judicial standard of equality is in its infancy.
38 Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-15, s.5. See also the Public Inquiries Act, supra,
note 25, s.9 which deems a witness to have objected to answer any question on the ground
that his answer may tend to incriminate her or him. This section also requires the commis-
sion to inform the witness of her/his right to object to answer any question under s.5 of the
Canadian Evidence Act.
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In order to claim the protection of any of the section 11 guarantees, the
claimant must be a person "charged with an offence". The Supreme Court of
Canada in Wiggelsworth v. R. 39 has read that phrase to limit the reach of sec-
tion 11 to criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. The same approach has
been applied in the context of an inquiry into alleged police abuse of a
prisoner in Robinson v. British Columbia.' In the latter case, the British
Columbia Supreme Court held that the person was governed by proceedings
under an order in council and was in no way charged with an offence. Accord-
ingly, any claim should be made under section 13 of the Charter at the point
where damaging evidence might be used in a later proceeding, but could not
be presently made under section 11 (c).
For the purposes of challenging administrative procedures, the key Char-
ter provision is section 7, which reads:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.
Section 7 may also be used to supplement other legal rights in the Char-
ter. If so, this may further limit the state's ability to obtain evidence. The use
of section 7 to expand rights expressly listed in the Charter can best be
demonstrated by cases concering an individual's section 11 (c) and section 13
rights against self-incrimination. This case study also provides an example of
section 7 as the umbrella provision encompassing the other legal rights in
sections 8 to 14.
In two important cases, R.L. Crain Inc. v. Couture and Thompson
Newspapers Ltd. v. Director of Inivestigations and Research, Combines
Investigation Act,4 the applicants sought to have struck down as a violation of
section 7, the inquiry procedures under the Combines Investigation Act,42
particularly section 17 (now section 19) which authorizes the Director to order
the examination of witnesses under oath. The purpose of the inquiry is to
gather evidence to be submitted either to the Attorney-General of Canada or
the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. The information gathered
39 Wiggelsworth v. R., [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, 28 Admin. L.R. 294, 60 C.R. (3d) 193, [1988]
1 W.W.R. 193, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 32 C.R.R. 219, 45 D.L.R. (4th) 235, 81 N.R. 161,
24 O.A.C. 321, 61 Sask. R. 105.
40 [1986] 4 W.W.R. 729, 3 B.C.L.R. (2d) 77, 28 C.C.C. (3d) 489 (S.C.).
41 R.L. Crain Inc. v. Couture (1983), 30 Sask. R. 191, 10 C.C.C. (3d) 119, 6 D.L.R. (4th)
478 (Q.B.) and Thompson Newspaper Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigations and
Research) (1986), 57 O.R. (2d) 257, 55 C.R. (3d) 19, 30 C.C.C. (3d) 145, 12 C.P.R. (3d)
97, 34 D.L.R. (4th) 413, 17 O.A.C. 330 (C.A.).
42 R.S.C. 1970, c.C-23 (now R.S.C. 1985, c.C-34; renamed R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.),
C. 19).
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may form the basis for a subsequent criminal prosecution. The applicants
argued that such an inquiry forced them to incriminate themselves.
The argument was brought under section 7 because neither section 11 (c)
nor 13 was of use to the applicants. Section 11 applies only to persons
"charged with an offence", and thus was not available to the applicants. Sec-
tion 13, which is echoed in section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, would
prevent the admission of the answers given at the inquiry into evidence at fu-
ture proceedings, but it would not prevent the police from using the answers
given at the inquiry as clues in their investigation. In both cases, the courts
found that the specific enumerated rights in sections 8 through 14 are merely
illustrative of the larger section 7 rights, a conclusion in accordance with the
Supreme Court ruling in Reference Re s.94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act
(B.C.).43
In Crain, the court found that section 7 recognizes the principles that the
individual is sovereign and that there are limits to the valid exercise of govern-
mental authority. One limit".., is that a person should not be compelled to
incriminate himself'.' Since the grounds for commencing an inquiry under
the Combines Investigation Act are all predicated on a suspicion of wrongdo-
ing, with no requirement that the suspicion be reasonable; since the witness
can be compelled to answer an unrestricted range of questions; since the
suspect need not be informed of the allegations against him; and since section
17 "may be an integral step in an eventual criminal prosecution of a suspected
person", the section violates section 7 of the Charter.45 The court declared the
offending sections to be of no force and effect.
In Thompson, however, the court found that, while sections 8 to 14 are
specific illustrations of the greater rights set forth in section 7, the only rights
against self-incrimination are found in sections 11 (c) and 13 of the Charter.
The court adopted the reasons of Holland J. at trial which, apparently, applied
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius to illustrate that
The rights set out in section 11(c) and section 13, then, are the only rights
against self-incrimination which are so deeply rooted in our law and tradition as
to be fundamental. There is no residual right to fall within the ambit of the sec-
tion 7 term 'fundamental justice'.'
43 Ref. Re. B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 69 B.C.L.R. 145, 48 C.R. (3d)
289, 36 M.V.R. 240, [1986] 1 W.W.R. 481, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 18 C.R.R. 30, 24
D.L.R. (4th) 536, 63 N.R. 266.
44 Supra, note 41 at 213.
45 Supra, note 41 at 220.
46 Thompson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) (1986),
54 O.R. (2d) 143, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 233 at 271, 9 C.PR. (3d) 72, 21 C.R.R. 1, 26 D.L.R.
(4th) 507 (H.C.).
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Since section 17 of the Combines Investigation Act did not infringe section 7
of the Charter, it was valid. An argument which contended that section 17's
provisions concerning disclosure of documents was a violation of section 8 of
the Charter was accepted at trial, but rejected on appeal.
Both the disclosure and the compulsory delivery of documents at an
inquiry could trigger a challenge based on the guarantees of section 8 of the
Charter which reads:
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
As with the Thompson case above, this was given little force in the civil
proceedings of Gershman Produce Co. v. Motor Transport Bd.47 The court
held that any section 8 rights would arise at the point of seizure and not upon
the board's demand for the delivery of the documents. There is also an in-
teresting question about whether evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
manner could be excluded before a commission of inquiry under section 24(2)
of the Charter. Such an interpretation does not appear likely to me but the
point is yet to be decided.
While other legal rights may be relevant to the operation of commissions
of inquiry, such as the right to have an interpreter under section 14 of the
Charter, the examples given make the point that the courts have been cautious
in extending Charter guarantees to the administrative domain. This general
approach to administrative decisions has been expressly emphasized in the
inquiry context. In respect to the section 7 argument in Robinson v. British
Columbia, Legg J. stated:
I agree with counsel for the Attorney General that the commission of inquiry
appointed by the Order in Council is a recommendatory, not an adjudicative,
body. It will report findings to the Lieutenant Governor in Council. It will make
no determinations as to guilt or innocence or civil or criminal liability. It cannot
terminate the employment of or otherwise discipline any person. Nor will its
report necessarily lead to. any subsequent proceedings against anyone. That
being so, it cannot be said that the inquiry will deprive any person of liberty or
security of the person: see Di lorio, supra, at 35 C.R.N.S. 57 at 76, per Dickson
J.; and Anderson v. Laycraft, Commr. of Inquiry (1978), 5 Alta. L.R. (2d) 155,
39 C.C.C. (2d) 217 (sub nom. Re Anderson and Royal Comm. into Activities of
Royal Amer. Shoes Inc.), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 706 at 713 (T.D.).
It cannot be presumed that the proceedings before the commissioners appointed
under the Order in Council will not be in accordance with the "principles of
fundamental justice". Rather, it must be presumed that they will be. If they are
not, they may be susceptible to judicial review at an appropriate juncture.'
47 16 Admin. L.R. 1, 37 M.V.R. 96, [1986] 1 W.W.R. 303, 17 C.R.R. 132,22 D.L.R. (4th)
520, 36 Man. R. (2d) 81.
48 Supra, note 40 at 747.
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This distinction between advisory and adjudicative functions is
somewhat surprising in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's rejection of
the distinction between rights and privileges in the section 7 challenge to
immigration procedures in Singh v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration.49
Nonetheless, this limited use of the Charter in the inquiry setting was also
expressed in Re Rosenberg and Morrison.' In that case the District Court
held that even if the protections of section 7 extended to "reputations", the
publication of a report with damaging comments would not violate the affect-
ed individual's rights. Accordingly, there was no need to let an individual
comment on a report prior to publication.
The early indications are that there will be no individual rights revolution
in the inquiry process as a consequence of the Charter. There are no Supreme
Court of Canada or even appeal rulings on point, but rulings in respect to
other administrative agencies reflect a cautious judicial approach. While the
Charter will expand some common law and statutory rights of the individual
in the inquiry process, the gulf between policy makers' values and lawyers'
values may not be as wide as is often assumed. This will be one of the
assumptions I will explore in the next section.
4. MYTHS, ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY PLAYERS IN PUBLIC
INQUIRIES
There are a number of myths and assumptions that underlie public
inquiries. One is that there will be an inevitable tension between the policy-
makers and the lawyers. John Willis referred to the clashing world views and
values of civil servants and lawyers5' in the administrative process generally
and that has been applied at this conference to commissions of inquiry. There
is, of course, some conflict of values between the lawyers and the policy
makers but the degree has been exaggerated. As we saw in the previous sec-
tion, the Charter has not been used by the courts to remake inquiries in
accordance with lawyers' values. While individual lawyers are oriented to-
wards the rights of particular clients, judges are very conscious of the collec-
tive good of the larger society and reflect this in their rulings from the bench
and as commissioners. Similarly, administrators are also concerned about the
fair treatment of individuals in the broader sense, as well as the efficient
execution of public policy.
49 Singh v. Min. of Manpower and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 12 Admin. L.R. 137,
14 C.R.R. 13, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422, 58 N.R. 1.
50 Re Rosenberg and Morrison (1983), 20 A.C.W.S. (2d) 334 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
51 J. Willis, "The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values" (1968), 18
U.T.L.J. 351.
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While the Willis dichotomy between lawyers and administrators is a
useful starting point, our analysis should not end there. It feeds another false
dichotomy between law and politics which should be questioned. I am not
skeptical enough to conclude that law is merely the exercise of naked power
and thus totally indistinguishable from politics but, the line between the two
professions is an increasingly thin one. Lawyers and judges, even in the judi-
cial arena, do make important public policy and enter the political fray on a
regular basis. Supreme Court decisions on the Charter, such as their abortion
decision in Morgentaler52 , serve to highlight the policy dimensions of judicial
rule-making. Furthermore, political actors find it increasingly difficult to es-
cape the law. Policy makers operate within an increasingly regulated and rule-
oriented world and many of them have become quite sophisticated in their
understanding of the legal framework in which they operate. Nova Scotia's
Marshal Inquiry provides a text book example of the interconnected webs of
law and politics that enshroud most public controversies.
Another assumption or myth of the inquiry process is that there is an
independent and objective solution to a controversial political question. It is
this belief which explains the tendency to appoint judges to commissions, as
the people most likely to pursue an objective solution. Ideally, objectivity and
independence should guide the operations of commissions of inquiry. How-
ever, as ideals, even the best commissioners can only approximate them.
Lawyers and judges do not have a monopoly on objectivity or independence
nor do policy makers have a monopoly on bias. One of the ways to alleviate
the identity crisis of inquiries is for governments and the general public to
accept that the commissioners are unlikely to find objective, politically
popular and cost-free solutions.
It is easy to overstate the power of either the government or the commis-
sion of inquiry to define the issues and shape the public agenda for the inquiry.
Because of the public nature of the process and the important role of the media
in Canadian society, much of the educational role of the commissioners is
taken out of their hands. That does not mean that the media should be ignored
as beyond control, but rather that media relations should be a high priority.
Thomas Berger clearly recognized the value of the media as the vehicle for
reaching the public about the impact that the proposed MacKenzie Valley
Pipeline might have on Canada's native peoples. By involving not just the
media but also those who would be most affected by a pipeline, Berger turned
his inquiry into a national seminar on the dreams and nightmares of Canada's
native people. By taking his deliberations to the native communities, he creat-
ed a media event which was broadcast to all Canadians.
52 R. v. Morgentaler, 63 O.R. (2d) 281 (note), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 62 C.R. (3d) 1, 37
C.C.C. (3d) 449, 31 C.R.R. 1, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 82 N.R. 1, 26 O.A.C. 1.
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The media have a natural love affair with commissions of inquiry53 and
commissioners are no longer wasting energy trying to keep the media out of
their hair. While it is true that the media can distort and sensationalize, they
are the crucial link to educating the public about the broad policy issues that
the inquiry is addressing. Furthermore, the media can be a very effective
lobby for government action and make it very difficult for governments to
ignore the ultimate recommendations. Television access to inquiry hearings
has made the participants more accountable as well as more open. Commis-
sioners also have a personal stake in good media relations as presiding over a
high profile commission of inquiry may give them a public image that they
will carry with them for the rest of their lives.' A good working relationship
between the media and the commission is vital to the success of the policy
mandate.
Whether we like them or not, lawyers are also key players in the public
inquiry process. Designating a judge to head up a commission gives it an
instant credibility and an aura of objectivity and independence. One of the
first acts of such commissioners is usually to appoint commission counsel,
who proceeds to define a fair inquiry process in accordance with lawyers'
values. While this may be appropriate for inquiries designed to arbitrate a
dispute or to determine guilt or culpability, it is less than ideal for the articula-
tion of public policy or the review of political judgment. This underscores the
need for the commission to solve its identity crisis early in the process and
assign the role of lawyers in the process in line with its mandate.
Judges and lawyers are not the ideal people for all kinds of inquiries.
Lawyers do not tend to be very good at applied social science and may not be
appropriate for a commission of inquiry structured on the research rather than
the arbitration model. Nova Scotia's Marshall Inquiry will provide an interest-
ing case study on the performance of lawyers in applied social science. Many
groups appearing before the Commission called upon it to squarely address
the problems of systemic discrimination in the Nova Scotian justice system.5
How the commissioners respond to this challenge will be interesting.
53 Mr. Justice Grange discusses the media's love affair with commissions in his contribution
to this volume. He also comments on the instant fame that is accorded to commissioners
and key participants such as himself or Susan Nelles. Supra, note 22.
54 Thomas Berger, and possibly Gerald LeDain, will be more remembered for their high
profile commissions than for their work as judges. When Gerald LeDain was appointed to
the Supreme Court of Canada the most frequent media reference Was to his involvement in
the Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs in Canada.
55 Three days were set aside at the end of the Marshall Inquiry hearings for academics and
representatives of Blacks and Natives in Nova Scotia to voice their concerns. It was struc-
tured not as a giving of legal testimony but rather as an academic forum for educating the
commissioners about the problems of racism in Nova Scotia. In the more legalistic phases
of the inquiry the commissioners were reluctant to entertain broad allegations of racism in
respect to the treatment of Donald Marshall Jr..
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Lawyers do bring valuable skills to the operation of commissions includ-
ing a healthy respect for the rights of individuals embroiled in the inquiry and
an insistence on fair procedures. The real challenge is to make the most of the
lawyers' skills without allowing them to take over the whole process. Thomas
Berger required the commission staff, including lawyers, to present their
views to the commissioners in the public hearing process along with other
participants.5 6 This meant that the staff had no special access to the
MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry and the views of the other participants
were accordingly given more prominence than might have been the case.
Creativity in the design of inquiry processes is to be encouraged and lawyers
should promote rather than hamper this evolution. The nature of the inquiry
itself should also determine whether or not lawyers should be the key players
in that particular commission.
5. NEW TRENDS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS FOR
COMMISSIONS AS PUBLIC POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Commissions of inquiry are an important vehicle for shaping public
policy. How effective they have been is a matter of conjecture. There has been
little empirical research on the operations of inquiries and nothing approach-
ing a costs-benefits analysis of their performance. It appears that the inquiry
process has been over-used and resorted to in inappropriate situations, produc-
ing what I have referred to earlier as an identity crisis. Often a parliamentary
committee, the relevant ombud or some other mechanism would be a more
appropriate response, especially in light of the escalating costs of commis-
sions of inquiry.57
There are also a number of newer trends in Canadian society which affect
all kinds of policy making, including that of commissions of inquiry. One of
these trends is a growing desire by members of the public to be involved in the
formation of policy and to have full access to the process. This has accentuat-
ed what John Willis referred to as the, "cult of openness"58 in the making of
public policy. Inquiries must be open processes with full access to both the
media and members of the general public. This facilitates the educational
mandate of inquiries but can complicate the articulation of public policy on
controversial issues. However, the open process greatly reduces the chances
that the ultimate recommendations of a commission will be ignored by the
government or significantly out of touch with the broader public opinion on
the matter.
56 T. Berger, "The MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry" (1976), 3 Queen's L.J. 3.
57 Frank Jacobucci presents some of the alternatives to commissions of inquiry in his preced-
ing contribution to this volume. Supra, note 6.
58 Supra, note 51.
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The public nature of the process has been reinforced by the guarantees of
the Charter as have the higher expectations of individual members of the
public in respect to fair treatment and reasonable procedures. Even before the
Charter the role of the media in shaping public policy was growing, but the
guarantees of "freedom of the press and other media of communication" give
an enhanced constitutional status to their demands for full access to the
channels of decision-making.
Another trend in the policy process is the increased demand that public
officials be accountable to the larger public. This expectation arises not just
from those involved directly in the commission of inquiry but from the larger
public itself, who foot the bills for the operation. Both the commissioners and
their staff are expected to produce value for money and whether. they have
provided this is difficult to assess. While there has generally been a greater
public acceptance of administrative boards as legitimate decision makers,
there is greater skepticism about ad hoc creations, such as commissions of
inquiry. This combination of high public profile and increased expectation of
accountability adds new levels of difficulty to the satisfactory operation of a
commission of inquiry.
While the challenges of meeting the new trends in policy making add to
the tasks of commissions of inquiry, the most difficult challenges have deeper
roots. These challenges include striking the proper balance between the
protection of individual rights and the execution of a broad policy mandate at
the same time. While lawyers are useful in striking the proper balance, they
should not totally dominate the design of inquiry procedures.59 It is vital that
the methodology and process of the commission of inquiry fit the subject
under study. Too often the subject has been forced to fit a procrustian bed
designed primarily by lawyers. It must also be recognized that there are many
different types of commissions. The balance between the rights of the individ-
uals involved and the need for flexible procedures for articulating public
policy must be struck anew in each particular case. Accepting that there are
few universal rules for the op6ration of commissions of inquiry would go a
long distance towards alleviating their identity crisis. It would also enhance
their value as a quintessential Canadian policy device.
59 John Willis has explored in his usual colourful fashion the virtues and vices of lawyers in
any human enterprise. J. Willis, "What I Like and What I Don't Like About Lawyers: A
Convocation Address", (1969) 76 Queen's Quarterly at 1.
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